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"Mankind censure injustice fearing that they may
be the victims of it, and not because they shrink from
committing it."
Plato, The Republic
Greek author & philosopher in Athens (427 BC-347 BC)
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, the United States, the most powerful democracy
in the world, was struck by a horrible event: aircraft hijackers' attacks to
the heart of the City of New York put an end to the lives of 2,973
innocent civilians. An international terrorist organization, Al Qaeda, took
responsibility for the act.' In response to the attacks, the U.S. Govern-
ment Executive branch put in place a series of highly controversial pro-
cedures. Amongst these procedures, the Executive branch claimed
authority to detain indefinitely individuals who were arbitrarily labeled
2
as enemy-combatants. As a consequence, many individuals were
detained pursuant to Executive action in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, inclu-
ding two Uighurs-Turkic Muslims that mainly live in a far northwest
region of China, Xinjiang.
During the course of their detention, the Uighurs were evaluated
by the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and were declared
non-enemy combatants. In theory, this determination should have preci-
pitated their release from their Guantanamo Bay incarceration.3 Initially,
however, Abu Bakker Qassim and A'del Adbu Al-Hakim (hereinafter the
"Uighurs") were not able to leave Cuba for two reasons. First, the Bush
Administration refused to send them back to China fearing persecution,
possible execution or, at least imprisonment since the Uighurs have
1 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 311 (2004), http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/911 /pdf/fullreport.pdf.
2 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, § 1005 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (U.S. 2004),3For unknown reasons, the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) has not
made public their review of these detainees, but merely published a compiled
version with the number of reviews conducted organized by date. See Combatant
Status Review Tribunal Summary, U.S. Department of Defense, available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050329csrt.pdf. See also Uighurs in
Guantanamo, http://uhrp.org/categories/Issues/Uyghurs-in-Guantanamo.
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historically been subject to Chinese Authorities' oppressive treatment.4
Second, letting them on to U.S. soil seemed to be out of the question, not
only for the fact that they had been detained and may have been
influenced in Guantanamo bay, but also because of the stigma associated
with Uighurs. They have been labeled as "Turkic Terrorists" by the
Chinese Government.5
In response to the U.S. Government's failure to release them, the
Uighurs filed a habeas petition challenging their further detention. Before
Judge Robertson in the Federal District Court for the D.C. Circuit, the
detainees' writ of habeas corpus was denied.6 This order was likely on its
way to appeal to determine whether they would be removed from
Guatanamo Bay or held there indefinitely. However, before the matter
4 Amnesty International has been intimately involved in the Uighurs' struggle in
Guantanamo Bay. This entity has not only explored the legitimacy of U.S.
grounds for the detention, but also questioned China's ongoing political crack-
down on what is known as "three evil forces" of "separatists, terrorists and
religious extremists." See Amnesty International, People's Republic of China:
Uighurs Fleeing Persecution as China Wages its "War on Terror, " March 2002
(ASA 17/10/2002).
' China has waged on the war on terror to change Uighurs label from "Separa-
tists" to "Terrorists" including changing their statutory criminal law to contain
the words "punish terrorist crimes." See Uighurs fleeing persecution as China
wages its "war on terror, " ASA 17/021/2004, July 2004 at 10. In face of such
transition, most countries have refused to provide asylum to Uighurs probably
ignoring the fact that they are actually victims of fundamental human rights
violation of Freedom of Speech and Association and no proper evidence was
established that they have ever engaged in terrorist activities.
6 Judge Robertson's holding clearly seems to be, for the most part, a byproduct
of U.S. Sup. Ct.'s failure to set forth guidelines on what remedies to provide to
detainees declared non-enemy-combatants. Accordingly, Judge Robertson states
the following in support of his order denying the Uighurs petition for writ of
habeas corpus:
In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court confirmed the jurisdiction of
the federal courts "to determine the legality of the Executive's
potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be
wholly innocent of wrongdoing." It did not decide what relief might
be available to Guantanamo detainees by way of habeas corpus, nor,
obviously, did it decide what relief might be available to detainees
who have been declared "no longer enemy combatants." Now facing
that question, I find that a federal court has no relief to offer. Qassim
v. Bush, 407 F. Supp.2d 197, 203(D.D.C. 2005).
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could be considered, the Uighurs received relief in likely the only way
they could-they were offered asylum by third-party countries Through
this asylum process, the Uighurs became the first detainees to be released
from Guantanamo since 2001.
Even though matters worked out for these two individuals, it was
only through the kindness of a willing third-party nation that their
potentially unbounded detention was ended. With the story of these two
innocent detainees as a starting point, the central goal of this Article is to
assess the legitimacy of current presidential policies toward the detainees
held in Guantanamo. Specifically, I will analyze the dangers of a system
that allows equivalent detentions for the following vastly different
groups: 1) those detained and yet to be adjudged enemy combatants; 2)
those adjudged to be enemy combatants, who may or may not be subject
to military commissions; and 3) those adjudicated and found not be
enemy combatants at all. The Article, however, will do more than
analyze the nature of these detentions. On the one hand, it will question
the disparate treatment visited upon non-citizen enemy combatants, as
opposed to the constitutional safeguards provided to U.S. citizen enemy-
combatants. Additionally, with regard to the authorization of this
treatment, this Article will challenge the U.S. Supreme Court to
meaningfully accept the burden of ensuring that constitutionally required
separation of powers are observed between the branches.
Part I of this Article presents an analysis of the Executive actions
which led to the creation of Guantanamo Bay and the use of Military
Commissions, 8 and questions whether the Executive branch holds the
7 After over four years of detention, the Uighurs were sent to a center for asylum
seekers in Albania which has a majority Muslim population. See Charley
Savage, Chinese Muslims sentfreom Guatanamo to Albania, The Boston Globe,
May 6, 2006 available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/
articles/2006/05 /06/chinese muslims sent from guantanamo to albania/. Yet,
until recently, other 17 Uighurs are still depending on other countries'
generosity to offer them asylum. CRAIG WHITLOCK, U.S. Faces Obstacles
Freeing Detainees, Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/16/ AR2006101601339 2.html?nav-rss
nation&g1.
8 The Military Commissions Act (the "MCA") was recently enacted in response
to the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749
(U.S. 2006), discussed later in this Article. Basically, the MCA endorses the
legality of the Military Commissions convened in Guantanamo. 10 U.S.C. §§
948(a)-950(w) (2006).
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power to undertake such actions in light of the principles of separation of
powers and checks and balances among the three branches of
Government. In developing the analysis of relevant congressional
actions, Part Ii will argue that separation of powers principles are at heart
of the organization and function of the U.S. Constitution. This Part will
further challenge these congressional actions as part of a discussion
about whether certain congressional delegations of legislative power to
the President were appropriate.
Part III will develop a discussion on the critical role the Judiciary
plays in directing a more active congressional response or "check" on
presidential actions. This Article suggests that such a role has not been
satisfied to the level the Founders intended. A critical reading of the
Federalist Papers evinces that the Founders spelled out the necessity that
checks and balances be preserved. By virtue of the U.S. Supreme Court
review of the substance of legislation Congress enacted, the Framers'
aimed at fostering a system in which individuals liberties should remain
protected as enunciated in the Constitution. This part will then question
whether the Executive has confined itself to the constitutional
boundaries. 9 In addition, this Part will briefly discuss the concept of
enemy-combatants and what the consequences are of being labeled as
such, including what implications can arise from being a U.S. citizen as
opposed to a non-U.S. citizen.
Part IV of this Article will develop attempts to provide for
alternative solutions to the detainees' unbounded detention. It will then
analyze the impact of current U.S. presidential and congressional choices
with respect to Guatanamo Bay on foreign policy, including international
treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory. In so doing, this Article suggests
that U.S. policies are likely violative of Article Fourth of the Geneva
Conventions which provides foreign individuals' protections from
submission to military tribunals prior to having been declared prisoners
of war (POW) and having charges properly filed against them.
9 In The Federalist Papers no. 80, Hamilton laid down principles pursuant to
which the federal judiciary power ought to be prescribed. Specifically, he points
out to the federal judiciary role of ensuring uniformity of the laws on the Union.
By way of example, he expressly states that the judicial authority extends to
cases which "arise out of the law of the United States passed in pursuance of
their just and constitutional powers of legislation ... [cases which] involve the
PEACE of the CONFEDERACY whether they relate to the intercourse between
the United States and foreign nations..."
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Guatanamo Bay Military commissions have proscribed procedural and
evidentiary rules, which are distinct from those of military courts-
martial, or other U.S. federal courts. This Article will suggest that these
rules fall short of what is required for these proceedings to be endorsed
as acceptable under our domestic law and treaty obligations.
This Article concludes by suggesting that even though the
Uighurs release may mark an initial showing of U.S. Government
progress in detainee treatment, it appears that a more active and stricter
judicial intervention may be necessary to secure rights for other
detainees. Such a posture is necessary to avoid abusive encroachments of
power among the branches of Government, and to ensure the
effectiveness of checks and balances erected by the Founding Fathers.
Furthermore, judicial intervention is critical to persuade the international
community that the U.S. still respects due process of law and its
obligations to ensure the protection of fundamental human rights under
international treaties, even in a 'theater of war.'
I. THE EXECUTIVE POWER TO DETAIN
As Deputy Counsel, John C. Yoo, correctly pointed out in his
memorandum'0 to the President, the events of September 11, 2001 raised
important questions with regard to the presidential authority to respond
with military action. Yoo concluded, without hesitating, that the Presi-
dent has broad authority to use military force."' In reaching his conclu-
sion, the deputy advanced that the constitutional text and structure give
the President unconditional authority to act in such circumstances.
Further, he reads the Federalist Papers to endorse broad presidential
authority. The Deputy also focused on how congressional action has
fully authorized the President's actions abroad as well as in practice and
history in the United States. While Deputy Yoo had legitimate grounds
for recognizing inherent presidential power in the field of national
security, his reasoning presented a narrow, one-sided reading of the
10 Deputy John C. Yoo is a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the
Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice. In Sept. 25,
2001, Deputy John Yoo drafted a memorandum in reply to the President's
inquiry as to the scope of his presidential authority to take military actions in
response to the attacks. See John Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority
to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting
Them, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ olc/warpowers925.htm.
11 Id.
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Constitution. The net result of such a reading is that it places a
disproportionate amount of constitutional power in the hands of the
Executive Branch vis-A-vis Congress.12
In an effort to challenge the choice to favor an unduly strong
Executive, a choice most likely driven by the emotional turmoil emana-
ting from the attacks, this Part of the Article will propose an alternative
reading of both Constitutional text and structure. This reading suggests
that the Federalist Papers provide a basis to accomplish a more balanced
proposition vis-A-vis Executive power. In examining the Federalist
Papers, this Part will conclude that a different reading of these docu-
ments can certainly provide that the Commander-In-Chief designation
does not bestow upon the President an unbounded authority to take
military actions. Finally, this Part will examine lawfulness of the
President's Executive Orders to detain the individuals seized in the war
on terror and to conduct military commissions in Guatanamo Bay. The
central question is whether these actions were tantamount to unconstitu-
tional "Executive legislating."
A. The Constitutional Text and Structure
In order to provide an in depth analysis of the constitutional text and
structure, this Subpart will be subdivided into the two following parts:
the Framers' intent and the constitutional text.
12 In citing to the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 812 (1982), Deputy Yoo reasoned that the President's constitutional
primacy "flows from both his unique position in the constitutional structure and
from the specific grants of authority in Article II that make the President both
the Chief of the Nation and Commander-in-Chief." Unfortunately, this results in
a convoluted proposition in that it wrongfully blends the functions of "Chief of
the Nation" with "Commander-in-Chief of the Army" into one single role over
expanding the powers of the President. In reasoning that the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army not the nation, the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, reasoned that
"[e]ven though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept," the court could not in
fairness to the Constitution hold that the "Commander-in-Chief has the ultimate
power as such as to take possession of the private property..." The Court went
on to say that the Constitution limits the President's functions in the lawmaking
process to the recommending of the laws he thinks wise and vetoing those he
thinks bad. In other words, mystifying the dual role of the President, as derived
from Article II, to grant him legislative power seems to overstep what the
constitutional structure seeks to accomplish.
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1. The Framers' Intent
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution vests in the President the role of
"Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States" and
requires him to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution of the
United States. He is also required to "faithfully execute" the laws of the
United States. Those who favor an expansive approach to the Executive
power usually read this section to give the President inherent and
independent constitutional authority to use military forces in response to
threats to national security and foreign policy of the United States.
3
Nevertheless, a more careful reading of the Federalist Papers suggests
that these powers are not so unbounded.
In the Federalist Papers no. 23, Alexander Hamilton states the
following in expressing his concerns about how national security ought
to operate:
The authorities essential to the care of the common
defense are there-to raise armies-to build and equip
fleets-to prescribe for their support. These powers
ought to exist without limitation ... [t]he circumstances
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for
this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed on the power to which care of it is committed
... the means ought to be proportioned to the end.
[Emphasis added]
In interpreting documents drafted so long ago, we run the risk of
oversimplification. Nevertheless, while the plain reading of Hamilton's
statements clearly indicates his utmost concern for national security, it
appears that, in seeking proportionality in the federal government,
Hamilton also sought to institute a balanced approach to national
security. Such an approach would necessarily involve cooperative gover-
nance of emergencies.1 4 Similarly, he further states:
Whether there ought to be a Federal Government
entrusted with the care of the common defense, is a
13 See Yoo's propositions in his memorandum to the President, supra note 10.
14 In the Federalist Papers no. 28, Hamilton seems to reinforce this notion of
proportionality when he states that "[t]he means must be proportionate to the
extent of mischief." The statement involves his proposition that, in times of
emergency, forces would be necessary.
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question in the first instance, open to discussion; but the
moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow,
that the government ought to be clothed with all powers
requisite to the complete execution of its trust.
[Emphasis added].' 5
It can be argued, that the words "Federal Government" were
italicized to evince that Hamilton was referring to the full measure of the
national government. Hence, Congress, not just the "President," would
need to be involved in the goal of maintaining national security.
This view of shared governance over emergency seems to be
favored in another relevant passage of the Federalist Papers, when
Hamilton contrasted the President's power with those of the king of
Great Britain. He explicitly stated that presidential powers are "in sub-
stance much inferior to [that of the king]. 1 6 As such, the Executive does
not have the power to legislate by decrees. Moreover, it is important to
contextualize the Framers' debates revolving national security. In his
arguments, Hamilton was seeking to promote the view of a federal
government taking over national security as opposed to leaving it in the
hands of the states. Therefore, Hamilton was articulating a brand of
federalism designed to ensure national versus local (state) response to
emergency. Only through using the complete federal government, which
15 Deputy John Yoo seems to ground his theory in the last part of Hamilton's
statement by concluding that "clothed with all powers" demonstrates the
Framers' clear intent that those powers were placed solely with the President to
defend the United States. While this might be a fair reading, it fails to consider
the text in its entirety to the extent it only extracts one sentence without
contextual foundation.
16 The Federalist Papers No. 69, provides, in pertinent part:
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of
the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally
the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance
much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as
first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the
British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the
RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by
the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the
legislature.
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represents the states through Congress, could the states have any voice in
the response.
Hamilton is not the only Founding Father whose view is critical
to this discussion. When James Madison proposed a balanced Govern-
ment by the creation of three separate branches,' he was cautious
enough to state that these branches are "by no means totally separate and
distinct from each other." 18 He went even further to say that "[t]he
Executive magistrateforms an integral part of the legislative authority"'19
and "there can be no liberty where legislative and executive powers are
united in the same person.,
20
In reconciling the Hamiltonian and the Madisonian views, one
thing is certain: it is not within the province of the Executive to legislate.
On one level, Hamilton envisioned an Executive with substantial autono-
my and prerogative. In contrast, Madison conceptualized the notion that
the Executive derived its powers from the legislature. He had a more
narrow view of the Executive, where it had the power to execute the
laws, but not to initiate them. His Executive would improve laws and
provide for effecting corrections for those laws, but he would not replace
legislation. While Hamilton's view seemed to prevail, judicial imprima-
tur has sought to limit presidential power to those expressly provided for
under the Constitution and those implied powers necessary to carry out
the express powers. 2 1 Despite Hamilton's and Madison's general dis-
agreements with respect to ideas, the overarching language of the
Federalist Papers stands for the proposition that the federal government
should strive for a balance of power between the branches. The three
branches have their powers proportionally allocated, subject to the
checks exercised upon one another, to ensure those powers are not
misused or unduly encroached upon. Had the President been vested in
persona the inherent power to legislate, Article I would be meaningless
and Congress would be a nullity.
2. The Constitutional Text
As it can be concluded from the previous discussions in this Section, the
desired balance of power can be described in a word: proportionality.




21 See Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Certainly, in light of history and the Framers' pronouncements, arriving
at the conclusion that the Executive lacks the power to take military
actions in light of belligerent attacks to the nation would be somewhat
unrealistic. The issue is whether the office of the President can do so
without Congress' explicit collaboration and oversight. On balance,
while Article II of the U.S. Constitution's plain language empowers the
President to act as Commander-In-Chief, the concern should be centered
in the nature and scope of such powers rather than whether they actually
exist. In the context of foreign relations, it has been argued that the
President has the ability to legislate. Those who undertake this view,
support it under the notion that the President is the head of the nation's
international relations.2 2 Such a view has been advanced to justify that
presidential powers in the foreign arena are broader than on domestic
soil. 23 However, it is well settled that the power to legislate lies in the
22 A careful reading of U.S. Sup.Ct. Opinion in Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981), may evince a certain struggle on the part of the Court in
upholding presidential action without express congressional approval. While the
Court seems to give deference to President's actions in foreign relations, its
rationale somewhat reveals attempts to justify such holding. For example, the
Court rationalized that, despite lack of congressional express authorization in the
President's issuing of Executive Order withholding Iranian funds until U.S.
civilians taken as hostages be released, Congress had acquiesced to by virtue of
a longstanding practice. The Court concluded that Congress' acquiescence
amounted to congressional consent to President's conduct. Thus, it can be
argued that this holding is rather of very limited consequences than that of a
general rule or pronouncement of President's inherent power. As Justice
Rehnquist stated in the opinion: "We are confined to a resolution of the dispute
presented to us" and "we attempt to lay down no general "guidelines" covering
other situation not involved here, and attempt to confine the opinion only to the
very questions necessary to decision of the case." Id at 660461.
23 In U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936), Justice
Sutherland acknowledged that the President had considerable discretion in
conducting foreign relations. Nonetheless, he was also cautious enough to
restrict the scope of the opinion rather than simply holding the President had
unfettered inherent powers:
[I]t is evident that this court should not be in haste to apply a general
rule which will have the effect of condemning legislation like that
under review as constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative
power. The principles which justify such legislation find over-
whelming support in the unbroken legislative practice which has
2008]
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hands of the Legislative branch.24 With that in mind, the Executive's
ability to legislate, even in foreign relations, should be very limited to
avoid consequences arising from undesirable encroachments and poten-
tial abuses of power.25 Taken together, the Framer's intent and constitu-
tional text do not support the Executive acting without congressional
sanction to detain and try persons captured in furtherance of the "War on
Terror." A potential remedy to this problem will be discussed below in
Part IV. First, however, we need to look at the explicit provisions of the
Orders at issue.
B. The President's Executive Order
On the thirteenth day of November, 2001, President Bush signed the
Executive decree titled the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism" (the "Order").26 The Order
authorized the Secretary of Defense to detain and to convene military
commissions of any current or former member of the Al-Qaeda organi-
zation, as well as anyone who "aids or abets" its work or harbors its
members. The order provided for the imposition of death penalty subject
to limited review in civilian courts. 2' The outcome of the Order was the
creation of a military base, Camp X-Ray (now the so-called Camp
Delta), located in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The camps can be likened to
prevailed almost from the inception of the national government to
the present day.
Once again, we are presented with a narrow holding. Justice Sutherland next
went to the specifics of the case and examined past congressional legislation
authorizing the President to act the way he did. Thus, it is fair to conclude that
presidential actions in foreign relations ought to be subject to review as to their
scope and nature on a case-by-case basis.
24 In referencing to Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952), the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 (2006), rationalized that "whether
or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization,
to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers."
25 See Curtis-Wright Exp. Corp, supra note 23.
26 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (2001).
27 In his letter, the President proclaims "national emergency" and issues the
order pursuant to the authority vested in him as the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of The United States. Id.
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4. 28
"maximum security" prisons. In January 2002, the first detainee was
taken into custody and placed in Guantanamo brought in wearing
shackles and black goggles. 29 By February 2003, the U.S. Government
had already detained 640 prisoners, including children between the ages
of 13 and 16 as well as the elderly. They were placed in these prisons
beyond the rule of law and the protection of any courts, and subject to
the mercy of their captors.
Upon initial review, the Order seemed to procure the preservation
of certain rights for the benefit of the detainees. 30 For example, among
others, the right to be treated humanely without discrimination based on
race, color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria; and the
right to adequate food. 3 1 However, the practical effect of this Order was
reflected in the U.S. Government's successful coordinated efforts of
federal prosecution and immigration authorities to hide detainees' names,
nationalities and addresses. They also initially obstructed any legal con-
sultation or any other sort of aid for all of them, except for very few
diplomatic missions from detainees' home countries and visits from the
28 See generally Guantanamo Bay A Human Rights Scandal, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/counter-terror-with-justice29 id.
30 The Order, supra note 26, provides for authorization of detention, treatment,
and trial of detainees. What would initially seem to be a careful procedural
outlining, has clearly been carried out by not only generating an arresting frenzy
in the Middle East, but also a shameful inhumane treatment of those individuals.
Section 3 of such order purports:
"Detention Authority of the Secretary of Defense. Any individual
subject to this order shall be-
(a) detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary of
Defense outside or within the United States;
(b) treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on race,
color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria;
(c) afforded adequate food, drinking water, shelter, clothing, and
medical treatment;
(d) allowed the free exercise of religion consistent with the require-
ments of such detention; and
(e) detained in accordance with such other conditions as the
Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
2008]
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International Red Cross.32 Since the Government refused to provide it, all
information about whom the U.S. military has detained and the condi-
tions of their confinement, is based upon publicly available data obtained
from press reports, both here and abroad. Detainees were only allowed
limited correspondence rights with members of their families. Detainees
were submitted to extensive interrogations despite several human rights
commissions' interventions on their behalf in attempts to provide them
decent treatment.33 Amnesty International has accused China of sending
a delegation to take part in those interrogations, which involved sub-
mitting the Uighurs to several torture techniques.34
In creating military commissions, the Order failed to provide for
procedural and substantive safeguards or guidelines to the commis-
sioners. It simply left these decisions in the hands of the Secretary of the
Defense. It failed to assure full, fair, speedy trials upon properly charged
individuals. It was not until 2003 that a prosecutor or defense counsel
was appointed.35 It took another year until someone was charged. In sum,
the Order did not provide for any basic constitutional rights while
creating a military commission. In actuality, it had many procedural and
structural flaws which have been the target of much criticism within the
nation and abroad.
The corollary of this political inertia is the continued detention of
vastly different groups: those detained and yet to be adjudged; those
adjudged enemy combatants, who may or may not be subject to military
commissions; and those adjudicated and found not be enemy combatants
at all. Another corollary that has recently arisen stems from the disparate
treatment of citizens, who are now given protection under U.S. constitu-
tional safeguards, and non-citizens, who are deprived of any safeguards,
let alone any constitutional rights. Despite these effects, the Bush
Administration has not given consistent signals about the future of the
32 See Uighurs in Guantanamo, available at http://www.uhrp.org/categories/Iss
ues/Uyghurs-in-Guantanamo/?articlelive- cd02b979d962f5fe89c63de96
ccdfd38.
33 See Amnesty International, Uighur Detainees Face Danger if Returned, July
13, 2004, available at http://www.uhrp.org/issues/uyghurs in guatanamo/news
1/uyghurs detainees face danger34 id.
35 id.
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36Guantanamo detainees. On one level, the Administration's position that
detainees will be released when the war on terrorism is over is tanta-
mount, as commentators have charged, to saying that we will hold them
there for the rest of their lives. 3 By the end of 2004, The Washington
Post published statements from the deputy commander of the detention
facility who stated that most of the detainees would be either released or
transferred to their countries. What seemed to be reason for human rights
advocates' celebration did not last very long. A few months after the
deputy's statement, the Bush Administration promptly repudiated it. The
Washington Post then published statements by officials, which contem-
plated long-term solutions for the detainees. 38 These solutions included
indefinite detention. Predictably, new building facilities subsequently
started to be erected in Guantanamo.39
History backdates President Bush's Executive Order. Presidents
have typically avoided seeking congressional approval for waging war.
They have usually invoked their constitutional authority as Commander-
in-Chief of the nation, claiming its particular salience in times of
emergency. Presidents Johnson and Nixon deployed military forces in
36 In a speech gave in Sept. 2006, The President still attempted to persuade his
audience that every detainee held in Guantanamo is an enemy-combatant, when
in reality, some have already been deemed non-enemy-combatants:
It's important for Americans and others across the world to under-
stand the kind of people held at Guantanamo. These aren't common
criminals, or bystanders accidentally swept up on the battlefield-
we have in place a rigorous process to ensure those held at Guan-
tanamo Bay belong at Guantanamo. Those held at Guantanamo
include suspected bomb makers, terrorist trainers, recruiters and
facilitators, and potential suicide bombers. They are in our custody
so they cannot murder our people. [Emphasis added]. See President
Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected
Terrorists, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html
37 See, e.g., Joseph Levyveld, "The Least Worst Place," Life in Guantanamo, in
THE WAR OF OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2003)
(discussing Presidents Bush's statements as signifying that the detainees will be
held until the Islamic terroristic network is completely uprooted.)
38 John Mitz, Most at Guantanamo to be Freed or Sent Home, Officer Says, THE
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2004.
39 Dana Priest, Long-Term Plan Sought for Terror Suspects, THE WASH. POST,
Jan. 2, 2005.
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Vietnam in the 1960s without a declaration of war.40 And so did the first
President Bush in Iraq and President Clinton in Eastern Europe in the late
1990s. In each of these cases, the Presidents stressed that it was within
their role as Commander-in-Chief to deploy military forces in the
exercise of their obligations under the Constitution.4 1 The common justi-
fication for use of force revolved around the need for prompt and
decisive action. They further claimed to be acting pursuant to previously
enacted congressional legislation which vested them with broad
powers.42 President Bush seems to abide by this practice in issuing this
Executive order giving rise to Guantanamo and to the military com-
missions without Congress ever having issued a declaration of war.43 The
President relied on provisions of the Authorization for Use of Military
40 While it has been argued that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution represented
Congress' rubber stamp for President Johnson's military force deployment in
Vietnam, one should be cautious with the sweeping effect such conclusion
represents. Giving this Resolution an overbroad scope is to allow it to become
the standard rather than a deviation to the Declaration of War requirement under
the U.S. Constitution. Since the war in Vietnam, a series of controversial assess-
ments have arisen with regards to whether the reasoning supporting the
resolution were accurate. See Thomas L. Hughes, A Retrospective Preface
Thirty-five Years Later, available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB 121 /hughes.htm (stating that whether the second Tonkin incident trig-
gering the Resolution ever occurred and was deliberate rather than a byproduct
of U.S. troops' provocation is still unclear). In other words, if the U.S. Consti-
tution purports a framework to safeguard against encumbrance among the three
branches of government so that checks and balances can be maintained, the
scope of such exceptions, if any, to the constitutional demand for a congres-
sional Declaration of War must be observed.
41 "Before [the President] enter[s] on the execution of his office, he shall take the
following oath or affirmation:-"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the
best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States." U.S. Const., Art II, Sec. 1.
42 See supra note 37. It appears that the common practice is to make use of
congressional action with respect to prior wars as extended authorization to
future conflicts. However, as the current "War on Terror" illustrates, the ques-
tion becomes: How far can the President go in relying on prior statutory
authorizations? This question will be addressed in next part of this Article.
43 Even if it is argued that the President relied on past congressional legislation,
the question is whether there was legislation delegating him the authority to
create Guantanamo Bay and convene military commissions.
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Force (AUMF) as conferring him the initial authority to detain indivi-
duals immediately.4 4 Whether he in fact acted pursuant to congressional
authorization goes not to the question of whether there was legislation
directed to national security, but whether the legislation was enacted to
allow the President to issue the Order. If so, the next inquiry is whether
the underlying congressional delegation is consistent with constitutional
principles.
In light of these considerations and in the face of this Article's
proportionality approach to interpret Article Ii and the Federalist Papers,
a singular notion of the President having a broad and independent
authority to act without explicit congressional directions and judicial
oversight seems incompatible with these documents. The next Part
addresses whether Congress, in fact, has empowered the president to
issue such order and, if that is the case, whether congressional approval
of Executive legislating constituted an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative province.
II. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
Despite the absence of a formal declaration of war within the meaning of
U.S. Constitution,45 Congress has historically delegated its powers to the
President in times of war.46 Nevertheless, this Article casts doubt as to
whether congressional authorizations, embodying the laws of armed
conflict and military tribunals, can be constitutionally delegated to the
Executive branch. This part of the Article will suggest that the AUMF
text actually granted unfettered discretion with respect to current
presidential practices and that such a delegation is not consistent with
constitutional principles. This Article argues that such an affirmative
legislative action was not intended to provide for a rubber stamp of
unbounded authority to the President through the examination of the
constitutional text and structure and the War Power Resolution ("WPR").
In actuality, explicit provisions in the WPR appear to require constant
44 This Executive order states in part: "By the authority vested in me as
President and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution." See supra note 26.
45 U.S. Const., Art. I Sec. 8 (providing that the "Congress shall have Power ...
[t]o declare War").46 See50 U.S.C.A. § 1541.
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reassessment of presidential actions.4' Furthermore, this Article proposes
that the WPR's provisions represent limitations on the presidential power
delegated thereunder and that these limits have been exceeded by virtue
of the AUMF enactment.
This Part of the Article will next discuss and examine two other
equally controversial pieces of legislation enacted by Congress: the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commission Act. This
Article suggests that the language of these statutes mirrors the inherent
difficulties both the Executive and Legislative branch have faced in
attempting to create a partisan foreign policy. This Part concludes that,
while many members of the House and the Senate vehemently criticize
the WPR's failure to reign in the Executive, by ignoring its mandates,
Congress fails to take actions to ensure bipartisan supervision of foreign
policy. In a sense, all these two statutes seem to do is to expand
presidential powers and to codify former Executive orders, rather than
foster the collaborative and interdependent relationship between the
Executive and the Legislative branches envisioned by the Framers when
they drafted the Constitution.
A. Strike One: The War Power Resolution ("WPR") 8 &
Joint Resolution 23 (A UMF)49
The President is expressly empowered in the Constitution to conduct
congressionally declared war.50 By enacting the WPR in 1973, Congress
conferred on the President the power to introduce military forces into
hostilities.5' Since the WPR was enacted, liberals, conservatives, and
independents have all criticized the law. Some concluded that the law
never worked. Some have argued that the problem with the resolution
lies in some ambiguous terms left undefined. 52 On the other hand, both
political branches face a consistent inability to arrive at a proposition
which would potentially reduce the atmosphere of uncertainty generated
47 [d.
4' 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48.
49 AUTHORIZATION TO USE MILITARY FORCE, S. J. Res. 23 Public Law 107-40,
115 Stat. 224) (Sept. 18, 2001) (section 2(b)(1) refers to WPR as the legislation
enabling Congress to this joint resolution).
50 Article 11 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war. See.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
51 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
52 See supra note 62.
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by an unstable, or even absent, bipartisan foreign policy. What follows
from these two sides is the recognition that the WPR has many short-
comings which have resulted in several grounds for disagreements in
both the House and the Senate and have never really been resolved. The
paragraphs that follow will analyze some critical parts on the WPR to
demonstrate the consequences of this deficient bipartisan policy.
In examining the language in the WPR, the first question that
should arise relates to its purpose and application. Section 1541(a) of the
WPR provides:
It is the purpose of this chapter tofulfill the intent of
the framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure the collective judgment of both the Congress and
the President will apply to the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use
of such forces in hostilities or in such situations."
(Emphasis added).53
There are, at least, two ways of interpreting the meaning of the
word "hostilities" as "clearly indicated by the circumstances., 54 One way
is to suggest it encompasses a considerably broad coverage, involving
essentially every combat troop's situation. In other words, under an
expansive interpretation of section 1541, the meaning of hostilities
"clearly indicated by the circumstances," virtually always would allow
the President to deploy Armed Forces to repel against hostilities. The
alternative view would suggest that, in reading subsections (a) and (c) 55
of the above section together, the President could only take action in
5' 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a).
54 id.
55 Subpart (c) of 50 U.S. § 1541 provides:
"Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; limitation
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief
to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situ-
ations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declara-
tion of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces."
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three situations: (1) under a declaration of war; (2) with specific statutory
authorization; or (3) where it necessitated by a national emergency
created by an attack upon United States, its territories or possessions, or
its armed forces.56 Further, subsection (a) expressly alludes to a colla-
borative undertaking rather than merely granting unilateral power to the
President. It endeavors to fulfill the intent of the framers57 and to ensure
the collective judgment of both Congress and the President in introducing
hostilities here or elsewhere.
Consequently, even though WPR delegates congressional power
to the President, there are limits and restraints upon the President in the
exercise of such powers. For example, the national emergency exception
allows the President to deploy military forces in the absence of con-
gressional authorization. 5 8 However, the President's powers under this
exception are not unbounded. He must report to Congress immediately
and, unless Congress specifically approves further action, the President
has 60 days to "terminate any use" of U.S. armed forces. 59 Once again,
this language should be an indicator that the purpose of the resolution
was to strive for balance in the decisionmaking which commits the
nation to hostilities.60
56 [d.
57 In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison once wrote:
The constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments
demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most inter-
ested in war and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied
care, best the question of war in the legislature. See Al Gore, Our
Founders & the Unbalance of Power, available at http://www.
jihadunspun.com/founders-algore-two.htm.
Unless an overly creative interpretation of Madison's words leads elsewhere, it
seems evident that the framers sought to create a collaborative framework
amongst the three branches of government.
5' 50 U.S.C. §1541(c).
59 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) and 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)
60 There are legitimate arguments from the Senate as to potential issues arising
from the meaning of the word "hostilities." See, e.g., 134 Cong. Rec. E 423-0,
1 0 0 th Cong., 2d (March 1, 1988). For the purpose of this Article, however, one
should assume that the word "hostilities" does include the events taking place in
Sept. 11, 2001 for two basic reasons: first, this paper does not advance lack of
presidential power, but abuse thereof; second, reducing the panoply of issues
revolving around this resolution to the meaning of hostilities seems to result in a
very limited reading of the legislation thereto.
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The problematic aspect of such legislation is that it is not solely
derived from the Presidents' historical indifference with respect to its
mandates, but also emanates from Congress' own inconsistent actions. In
effect, Congress has fostered presidential unfettered powers by enacting
subsequent legislation that substantially enlarges the powers of the
Executive. The AUMF is a clear example of this type of legislation. In
this joint resolution, Congress authorizes the President to
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or har-
bored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or per-
sons."(Emphasis added).
By virtue of the AUMF, Congress has, in essence, stripped itself
of the power to legislate within the international terrorism minefield. The
AUMF is silent as to any type of collaborative framework between the
two branches. Rather, the AUMF expressly grants the President wide
discretion to determine which individuals or organizations have planned,
authorized, committed, or aided in terrorist actions against the United
States. No substantive or procedural guidelines are provided to the
President in making those determinations.61
61 The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether Congress can
delegate its powers to the Executive Branch. In Clinton v. City of N. Y., the Court
held that the President's exercise of power under Line Item Veto Act to cancel
items of new direct spending and items of limited tax benefit violated the
Presentment Clause. 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998). The Court reasoned that the Line
Item Veto departed from "firely wrought" constitutional procedure for enact-
ment of laws, to the extent the President's actions had both the legal and
practical effect of amending acts of Congress by repealing portions thereof, and
did not come within his constitutional veto power. Moreover, the Court was
wary of the fact that the President had wide discretion to decide whether or not
to cut particular spending provisions. In other words, the Court did not seem to
favor a congressional delegation of power that results in authorizing the
President to create a different law: A law "whose text was not voted on by either
House of Congress or presented to the President for signature." Id. at 419. The
Court concluded that the Line Item Veto effectuated Executive legislating. In
this regard, the AUMF could be compared to the Line Item Veto Act. By
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While Congress is likely attempting to center the decisionmaking
power in the hands of one individual to expedite the process of respond-
ing to hostilities,62 the dangers revolving around the AUMF cannot be
overstated. It potentially entails an open-ended and inappropriate delega-
tion of Legislative war lawmaking powers. In other words, it is within
the province of the legislature to enact statutes providing for the substan-
tive and procedural basis to detain individuals. It follows that, in light of
the requirements of intelligible principles mandated under the Constitu-
63tion, Congress has failed to appropriately delegate its powers to the
President. The AUMF, in essence, gives the President "carte blanche" to
determine who or what organizations framed the attacks on September
11 free of any congressional oversight.
The broad delegation in the AUMF resulted in a myriad of
detentions without charge. It further resulted in the President's refusal to
answer to legitimate requests for information from Congress and his
indifference to federal courts' orders. Hence, any notion of a bipartisan
foreign policy is further deteriorated by Congress' own hands.64
allowing the President to decide what individuals or organizations are classified
as "hostilities," the AUMF frames the same premise rejected by the Court in
Clinton in that the President is entitled to enact legislation in contravention of
the Presentment Clause. In that sense, it would be same as allowing the Presi-
dent to decide, in terms of domestic laws, the elements of a crime and who
should be criminalized thereunder. C( Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
and IN.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
62 Al Gore has recently recognized that the emergence of new weapons in
modern warfare may naturally lead to reconsideration of the nature of the
Executive's war making power. However, he cautions that such new considera-
tions should not "render moot the concerns our founders had" in carrying out a
balanced, carefully designed process to avoid threatening our liberties. In sum,
while complexities of modern warfare may justify faster decisionmaking
processes, those should be limited to the extent they do not represent a threat to
democracy. See Al Gore, supra note 57.
63 See Clinton, supra note 61, at 484 (rationalizing that Congress cannot delegate
any part of its legislative power except under the limitation of a prescribed
standard. The Constitution permits only those delegations where Congress "shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [act] is directed to conform").
64 Commentators have expressed serious concerns on how the Houses voted for
the AUMF: "if we oppose it, we will be damaged politically for years to come,
and since it will pass anyway, why not support it and avoid incurring that
political damage?" In other words, the legislative branch seemed, at least in part,
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Naturally, Guantanamo Bay represents the clear and present danger of
this non-bipartisan foreign policy. A study conducted by Seton Hall
University scholars provides factual data to support this assertion. 65 The
study revealed that fifty-five (55) percent of the detainees have not
committed any hostile act against the United States or its coalition allies;
only eight (8) percent of the detainees were characterized as AI-Qaeda
fighters. Of the remaining detainees, forty (40) percent have no definite
connection with Al Qaeda at all and eighteen (18) percent have no
definite affiliation with either Al Qaeda or the Taliban. Thus, without
any criteria, the Government has detained innumerous persons based on
mere affiliations with a large number of groups that are not even on the
Department of Homeland Security's terrorist watchlist.
66
to have a political agenda as an underlying motive to pass this joint resolution.
Query whether such deference reflects the Framers' intent in fostering the
doctrinal checks and balances across the branches of Government. See Glenn
Greenwald, Giving Democrats a pass on ending the war, February 12, 2007,
available at http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/02/12/democrats/
index.html.
65 These numbers were derived from a study conducted by the law school at
Seton Hall University. The study concluded that most prisoners were being
turned over to U.S. forces by people who wanted the bounty paid for captives.
See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, Report on Guantanamo Detainees, A Profile of 517
Detainees Through Analysis of Departmetn of Defense Data, Feb. 08, 2006,
available at http://law.shu.edu/news/ guantanamo report final 2 08 06.pdf.
66 On 26 March 2007, David Hicks, an Australian who was formally charged
and convicted by the military commissions in Guantanamo, entered a guilty plea
to the charge of material support for terrorism. A plea agreement was drawn up
on 27 March 2007. On 31 March 2007, a US military tribunal handed down a
seven-year jail sentence to David Hicks on charge of supporting terrorism but
suspended all jail time but 9 months. A stipulation of the plea bargain ensured
that the five years that Hicks remained at Guantanamo Bay would not be
subtracted from any sentence handed down by the military tribunal. Further
conditions are that Hicks should not speak to the media for one year, Hicks was
to not take legal action against the United States and that Hicks was to withdraw
allegations that the US military abused him. Why are a few detainees so
fortunate? Is there any meaningful distinction? See Hicks home 'in months,
March 27, 2007, available at http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/
0,20867,21454470-601,00.html; Hicks plea made 'to escape hell', March 27,
2007, available at http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21453869-
5015421,00.html; and Hicks shouldn't be a hero: PM, March 31, 2007, available
at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200703/s1886515.htm.
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Furthermore, the nexus between such organizations varies
considerably. For example: eight (8) percent were detained because they
were deemed "fighter for;" thirty (30) percent considered "members of;"
and the large majority are detained solely on the basis that they are
"associated with" a group or groups the president asserts to be terrorist
organizations. A lingering two (2) percent of the prisoners have their
nexus unidentified. Finally, prisoners deemed not to be enemy-
combatants-mostly Uighurs, are actually accused, but not charged, of
67
more serious allegations than those still deemed enemy combatants. To
aggravate the situation even further, the meaning of each of the above
categories is unclear. Hence, the lack of conspicuous and effective
criteria in adjudicating these individuals results in their unnecessary and
arbitrary detention. Had Congress appropriately provided for intelligible
principles in the AUMF for the determination of who should be detained
in Guatanamo as well as how they should be adjudicated, this would
likely not have occurred.
Conversely, times of emergency have been the common justifica-
tion for courts to apply lesser scrutiny to the Executive and Legislative
branches in the exercise of their constitutional powers. Emergency can,
at times, justify curtailing the individual liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution.6 8 However, the aftermath set forth above exemplifies the
risks of the abuse of expansive Executive power. In other words, to avoid
undue encroachment between the two branches, congressional delega-
tions of powers should be limited by congressionally implemented
69policies setting forth intelligible principles. Such policies cannot be
determined by the Executive branch without running afoul the principles
67 Supra note 68.
68 See Barnes & Bowman, Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Interdisciplinary
Approaches to Exploring Burgeoning Rights Conflicts After September 11, 2001
at 21 (unpublished). In explaining the underlying consequences of lifting consti-
tutional constraints in times of emergency, the Article advances that claiming
emergency to enlarge otherwise inexistent executive powers is criticized in two
dimensions: (1) executive action is likely to be worse in times of emergency
than in normal times; and (2) these powers can potentially pass beyond
limitations to noncitizens held outside American soil and hold them off for long
time periods. Thus, an expansive, unrestrained executive power prompted by
emergency situations can result in irreparable costs to individual liberties. See
also Oreon Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always
Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003).
69 See supra note 65.
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of separation of powers fostered under the Constitution. The AUMF fails
to promote a balanced, limited and guided delegation of legislative
power to the Executive branch. To the extent that a state of emergency
calls for prompt actions, the AUMF is grounded upon principles incom-
patible with the notions of individual liberties and the promotion of a
democratic society so solidly engraved in our Constitution. As a result,
the AUMF simply does not provide for intelligible principles to limit the
President's actions under the statute, thereby violating the Constitution.
Because the Constitution does not explicitly deny Congress the necessary
resources to enable effective performance of its functions, any delegation
of congressional powers to the Executive branch should not be
unbounded.
However, the AUMF is not the sole problematic legislation. The
next two Subparts of this Section addresses two other equally controver-
sial enactments: the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) and the
Military Commissions Act (MCA). These statutes evince the consequen-
ces of expansive presidential powers. This Article concludes they also
amount to Executive legislating.
B. Strike Two: Detainee Treatment Act of2005 ("DTA '70
On December 30, 2005, the President signed bill H.R. 2863 approving
the DTA. Among other things, the DTA purported to provide for guide-
lines for the treatment of Detainees in Guantanamo. In his statement, the
President asserted that the provisions dictated in the DTA were as
follows:
[I]n a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the President to supervise the unitary execu-
tive branch and as a Commander-in-Chief and consistent
with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power,
which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the
Congress and the President... protecting the American
people from further terrorist attacks. 7
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd, §§ 1001 1006 (2005). Also known as the "McCain
Amendment."
71 The Statement by the President, 2005 WL 3562509, December 30, 2005.
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The quotation above exemplifies the President's broad reading of
the DTA. This Article suggests that this reading seems inconsistent
with the roots of the statute.73 From the standpoint of the President's
expansive view of the DTA, such legislation in effect fails to take into
account that it resulted from the incorporation of "the obedience to
orders" defense in the McCain Amendment.74 The amendment primarily
was intended to send a message to U.S. forces that cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment or punishment of detainees is not permissible. The
original purpose of the Amendment was to codify a humane treatment
obligation imposed upon U.S. Armed Forces. To the extent that the
President has ordered the detainees to be treated humanely, he explicitly
curtailed this treatment by creating a "military necessity" exception in
72 In his statements, the President has typically engaged in calling upon the emo-
tional aspects and resentment with respect to 9/11 to justify controversial mea-
sures toward the detainees. See e.g. Press Conference of the President, Rose
Garden, September 2006 available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/09/20060915-2.html ("This week our nation paused to mark the
5th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. It was a tough day for a lot of our citizens. I
was so honored to meet with family members and first responders, workers at
the Pentagon, all who still had heaviness in their heart. But they asked me a
question, you know, they kept asking me, what do you think the level of deter-
mination for this country is in order to protect ourselves, is what they want to
know."); President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Sus-
pected Terrorists, September 2006 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html ("On the morning of September the 11 th,
2001, our nation awoke to a nightmare attack. Nineteen men, armed with box
cutters, took control of airplanes and turned them into missiles. They used them
to kill nearly 3,000 innocent people. We watched the Twin Towers collapse
before our eyes-and it became instantly clear that we'd entered a new world,
and a dangerous new war.")
7 See, e.g., A Weak Defense, The Washington Post, December 6, 2005, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/05/
AR2005120501615_pf.html (stating that the president could accept the real
meaning of Sen. John McCain's amendment to the defense appropriations bill,
which prohibits "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" for all prisoners held
by the United States. The legislation has overwhelming support in Congress, as
the White House recognizes; already, the administration has shifted from
threatening a veto to bargaining with Mr. McCain over granting immunity to
CIA personnel involved in abuses).
14 42 U.S.C. 1404(a).
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the DTA.75 In other words, military necessity could override principles of
humane treatment in contravention to the most basic understandings of
the laws of war and overarching U.S. policy. 76 Members of the Senate
demanded the detainees to be treated humanely irrespective of military
necessity override. Arguably, this demand culminated in a compromise
to avoid exceptions to humane treatment. 77 However, a new provision
was added to the statute that allowed Government employees to raise an
"obedience to orders defense" to any charges alleging violation to this
new statutory prohibition. While such a defense might seem reasonable,
it undercuts the initial major objective under the McCain Amendment
which was to legislate against inhumane treatment of detainees. Accord-
ingly, with this act, Congress and the President might have collectively
set their seal on an American policy of torture.
But these are not the sole problems revolving around the DTA.
For example, another problematic aspect is that it expressly ousts subject
matter jurisdiction from civilian courts to hear claims brought by the
detainees. 78 It further denies constitutional rights to aliens held as enemy-
combatants. Whether the statute constitutes Congress' attempt to fore-
close jurisdiction from federal courts, thus violating separation of powers
principles solidified in the Constitution,7 is a source for polarized
75See Re: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, President's
Memorandum, Feb 7, 2002 (stating in part "I hereby reaffirm the order pre-
viously issued by the Secretary of Defense to the United State. Armed Forces
requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate
and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles
of [the] Geneva [Conventions]").
76 U.S. Const., VIII Amend. ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
77 The Executive branch would then be responsible for upholding the nations'
commitments to Geneva, leaving it up to the president to establish any violations
for the handling of suspects that falls short of a "grave breach." Among the
several "grave breaches" listed in the agreement is torture, as well as other forms
of assault and mental stress. There is no list, however, of specific interrogation
techniques that would be prohibited. However, given the innumerous U.S.
reservations to Geneva, the practical effect of this agreement was requesting the
president to keep the status quo.
78 Section 1005(e) expressly prohibits aliens detained in Guantanamo from
applying to the writ of habeas corpus.
79 U.S. Const., Art. 11, Section 1 (vesting the judicial power to the courts). In
accord, Hamilton laid out in Federalist Paper 78:
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debates among legal scholars. Many have analyzed whether Congress
maintains the power under Art. III to limit federal courts' jurisdiction.8 °
As a practical matter, however, the statute does not appear to entitle alien
detainees to bring applications of habeas corpus before U.S. federal
courts. The legislative history of the DTA tells us little, if anything,
about whether it was the intent of Congress to deprive federal courts of
jurisdiction grounded upon citizenship distinctions. Nevertheless, the end
result of the statute with respect to habeas is the deprivation of
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitu-
tional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put
upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be
answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not
to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It
is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to
enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that
of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the
courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the
laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A consti-
tution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a funda-
mental law. It, therefore, belongs to them to ascertain its meaning,
as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable
variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the
Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents. (Emphasis added).
80 The "Exceptions and Regulations Clause" of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitu-
tion provides in pertinent part: "(i)n all the other Cases before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." In
interpreting this provision, scholars have advanced two alternative views. One
view reads the "Exceptions and Regulations Clause" to provide Congress with
broad powers to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts. The competing view
reads the same clause as a modifier to the word "Fact" but not the word "Law."
The net result is to interpret this clause to actually limit Congress' ability to
confine jurisdiction of the federal courts.
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constitutional rights to aliens, whereas American citizens-detainees enjoy
full measure of habeas constitutional protections. 8 1
In any event, six years have passed since the attacks took place
and the President's Administrative Memoranda seem to be the sole
source of legislation aimed at national security. If one compares the DTA
language with the President's Executive Order issued in November 2001,
one might conclude that they are part of an integrated policy toward the
detainees. Apart from further legislative "touches" with respect to the
procedural guidelines, they appear to be the same in scope and nature.82
This Article claims that this is not the balance intended by our Framers.
In other words, merely rephrasing past presidential Executive orders does
not constitute effective performance of the congressional legislative
function. Rather, it may give rise to a parliamentary Government where
the power to create laws is centered in the President. The following
analysis of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (the "MCA") provides
further support to the notion of improper Executive legislating bolstered
throughout this Article.
C. Strike Three: Military Commissions Act of2006 (MCA)
Amnesty International has recently characterized the MCA as a congres-
sional stamp of approval of human rights violations throughout the "war
on terror." 83 Basically, the MCA was enacted in response to the U.S.
Supreme Court's most recent ruling on the detainees' cases, holding the
military commissions convened in Guantanamo unconstitutional.8 4 The
MCA's purpose was to establish procedures governing the use of mili-
tary commissions to try alien enemy combatants engaged in hostilities
against the United States. In many aspects, the MCA reaffirms the DTA.
"' This issue could be held moot after the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decisions
which held, in part, that federal courts do have jurisdiction to hear these claims.
In light of the MCA to be detailed next in this Article, it is interesting to observe
how overreaching legislation can become in times of emergency. See Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and Hamdan, supra note 8.
82 The DTA provides for subject-matter jurisdiction guidelines, among some
other di minimis additions to the President's Executive order.
83 Amnesty International, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MILITARY COMMIS-
SIONS ACT OF 2006, TURNING BAD POLICY INTO BAD LAW. Al Index: AMR
51/154/2006 (September 29, 2006).
84 See Hamdan, supra note 8.
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Most importantly, despite the U.S. Supreme Court's pronounce-
ment to the contrary in striking down the DTA,8 5 the MCA strips federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus appeals challenging the
legality of the detention of aliens held as enemy-combatants or awaiting
determination of their status. The MCA further takes away any
possibility of bringing substantive claims invoking any rights under the
Geneva Conventions.87 In addition, the MCA provides a broad definition
of alien enemy-combatant to determine who is subject to the MCA's
jurisdiction;"8 it broadens the scope of capture to include civilians far
from the battlefield 9 and it permits introduction of evidence obtained
85 Id.
86 The "habeas provisions" under the MCA provides in pertinent part:
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained as
an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
17 10 U.S.C. 47A, Sec. 948b(g) ("Geneva Conventions Not Establishing Source
of Rights-No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military
commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Convention as source of
rights").
88 The MCA basically reinstates the definition of unlawful enemy-combatant
under the DTA.
The term "unlawful enemy-combatant" means (i) a person who
has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents
who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is
part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or (ii) a person
who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful
enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or
another competent tribunal established under the authority of the
President or the Secretary of Defense.
The last part of the definition gives little guidance as to the scope of who can be
deemed an enemy-combatant which rather left to the discretion of the President
of the Secretary of Defense. In short, anyone can be deemed an unlawful enemy-
combatant under this vague standard. See 10 U.S.C. s. 948(a):
89 As a result of the broad scope under 10 U.S.C. § 948(a) referred supra note
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through potentially inhumane treatment. 90 Moreover, it allows the use of
classified evidence against detainees 9' and the military commissions to
hand down death sentences without instituting safeguards to ensure a fair
trial.92 It also restricts the detainees to solely rely on the attorneys of the
commissions' choice;93 and among other provisions, does not prescribe
when trials are to be conducted.94
These MCA provisions indicate that Congress should strive for
conspicuous and substantively fair measures in instituting proceedings in
military commissions. Nevertheless, the critical problematic aspects of
the MCA lie not only on disparate indifference to international prin-
ciples, but also on its failure to provide for expedited adjudication of
these detainees. Rather, the MCA promotes unbounded detention without
charge or trial despite instituting rules for trial. As a result, for many of
these detainees trial may never take place.
Furthermore, because the MCA fails to provide for a specific
definition of the term "enemy-combatant," it maximizes the threat of
unbounded detention to those awaiting status determinations. While the
U.S. has pronounced its disappointment at the international outcry in
response to the enactment of the MCA, such an outcry should not come
as a surprise in the face of the plethora of fundamental constitutional
issues raised by this piece of legislation. The MCA net result will likely
be prolonged legal challenges to this expansive suspension of habeas
90 10 U.S.C. 949(a) (C). The provision permits admissibility of evidence
obtained by coercion or compulsory self-incrimination subject to a "totality of
circumstances" test to determine whether evidence is reliable and if the interest
of justice would be best served if evidence is admitted. Introduction should be
limited to evidence obtained not in a manner inconsistent with section 2003 of
DTA, providing for prohibition of interrogation methods that amount to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. Because the standard for determining what
torture means is of vague nature and the Secretary of Defense has the discretion
to prescribe the rules under the MCA, the question what the boundaries are
under the statute remains unanswered. Further, there might be a fine line
distinction between coercion and torture.
91 10 U.S.C. 949j.
92 Trial under the MCA means trial within the meaning of its provisions, not fair
trial under the meaning of the Constitution of the United States.
93 10 U.S.C. 949k.
94 Remember that trials in Guantanamo are to be contingent upon the determi-
nation of the detainees' status by Secretary of Defense, CSRT or the President
under section 948(a).
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corpus. 95 In this battle among branches, hopefully another case will soon
be before the U.S. Supreme Court to set the boundaries of the MCA's
sweeping powers.96
Once this matter is within the domain of the Supreme Court, it
should emphatically reject the argument that the MCA implicitly grants
authority to the Government to detain those who fall within the boun-
daries of a rather overbroad statute. The Court should take a stand and
demand Congress to make a clear statement of intent to authorize the
indefinite detention of such a broad category of individuals because
when restrictions of basic rights are imposed, Congress is required to
make a clear unequivocal statement. As it currently stands, the MCA
falls short in doing so. By reaffirming the DTA, the MCA codified the
95 U.S. Mission in Geneva has stated:
The United States is disappointed by recent criticisms of the newly
enacted Military Commission Act from various European officials
and media outlets. Contrary to these criticisms, the rules governing
military commissions prescribed in this Act are fully consistent with
all U.S. international legal obligations, including Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions. These commissions may only be used to
try those designated as unlawful enemy combatants, a category of
persons long recognized in international law including by European
scholars, and accused of a defined set of crimes. These commissions
include all fundamental due process guarantees, including a pre-
sumption of innocence, the right to be present throughout the trial
and to see all evidence admitted at trial, an absolute bar on the
admission of statements obtained through torture, and strict limits on
the admission of coerced evidence. Military commission convictions
are also subject to review in the U.S. federal courts.
Some critics have also inaccurately asserted that the Military Commission Act
strips detainees at Guantanamo of the right to contest the legal basis for their
detention, which is the heart of habeas corpus relief. In fact, Military Commis-
sion Act reaffirms the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which vests in a federal
appellate court the authority to review enemy combatant determinations, which
comprise the legal basis for detention at Guantanamo. Spokesperson, Common
Misconceptions Regarding the Military Commission Act, Oct. 30, 2006 at
http://www.usmission.ch/ Press2006/103OMilitaryCommissionAct.htm.
96 In voting in favor of the MCA, Senator Arlen Specter, stated his wish that the
"court will clean it up." See Charles Babington & Jonatham Weisman, Senate
Approves Detainee Bill Backed by Bush, Sept. 29, 2006 at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlcontent/article/2006/09/28/AR2006092800824. html.
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structure for military commissions that the Court specifically struck
down in its latest ruling. 97 As this Article will discuss in the next section
that the Judiciary branch may itself be the cause of legislation such as the
MCA. By its continuous failure to enunciate a clear standard to be
implemented by the military commissions, the Court has likely set Con-
gress in motion to enact a version of the very scheme the Court had
rejected. In other words, Congress has avoided the application of the
Geneva Conventions and the UCMJ to the military commissions even
though the Court discussed that these standards should set boundaries for
any commissions Congress decides to create in the first place.
Due to the crucial role the U.S. Supreme Court's plays in
implementing the checks and balances required under the Constitution,
the next section of this Article will explore the Court's past decisions to
emphasize how it has avoided to meaningfully accept its constitutional
duty to oversee the use of expansive Executive powers in ruling on the
detainees cases.
III. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY:
A HISTORICAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
To complete the analysis on the roles served by the three branches of
Government in the realm of the indefinite and overbroad detentions in
Guantanamo, an assessment of past and current U.S. Supreme Court
decisions needs to be conducted. In light of the Congressional action in
response to Hamdam, this Article challenges that the U.S. Supreme
Court must meaningfully accept the burden of ensuring that the constitu-
tional separation of powers mandates are observed between the branches.
To accomplish this challenge, Part III provides a brief synopsis of the
facts and dispositions of the line of relevant cases addressing detainees.
In so doing, this Part will attempt to contextualize the Court's pron-
ouncements with respect to the scope and nature of the President's power
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces throughout history. This
Article further suggests that the Judiciary has set forth a series of
amorphous legal standards to determine the scope of the Executive
power in "wartime," and that these standards have produced the
confusion that now surrounds the cases arising out of the "War on
Terror." As they are partially responsible for the confusion they must
now be part of a solution, which is to clearly re-establish the line
97 Hamdan, supra note 8.
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between Congressional and Executive powers in the arena of war-
making. In order to contextualize how the judicial branch has contributed
to this confusion, the Subparts that follow will analyze the Court's
opinions prior to and post-September 11.
A. Judicial Rulings Prior 9/11
Since one of the major issues underlying the MCA revolves around
Congress stripping federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction over the
detainees, it is important to discuss the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
Johnson v. Eisentrager.98 This case involved 21 German nationals
convicted in a post-World War II U.S. military tribunal. They were
charged for violating the laws of war by continuing to fight against the
U.S. after Germany had already unconditionally surrendered. The Ger-
man nationals petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that their
trial, convictions, and imprisonment were in violation of the Constitu-
tion, federal law, and the Geneva Conventions. Relying on Ex parte
Quirin,99 the Government argued that these non-resident enemy aliens,
captured and imprisoned abroad, had no right to a writ of habeas corpus
in a court of the United States.'
In ruling in favor of the U.S. Government, the Supreme Court
articulated a detailed theory denying non-resident aliens outside the U.S.
access to U.S. federal courts. In essence, the Court held that the
Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or an immunity
from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in
hostile service of a Government at war with the U.S. To support its
assertion, the Court reasoned that modern American law had signifi-
cantly evolved so that enemies would not be "subject to public or private
slaughter, cruelty and plunder."10 1 However, the court recognized that
"inherent distinctions" between citizens and aliens existed. The Court
next concluded that extending constitutional protections beyond citizenry
for aliens held abroad would be incompatible with the scope of its
judicial power. 10 2 Hence, the decision was premised upon the idea that it
98 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
99 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
100 In this part of its argument, the Government cited to the Geneva Conventions,
perhaps implicitly recognizing that the prisoners had rights and obligations
thereunder.
101 Eisentrager, supra note 98, at 769.
102 id.
[v. 15
"WAR ON TERROR" SLIPPERY SLOPE POLICY
was the aliens' presence in the territorial jurisdiction that gave the
Judiciary power to act in such cases as opposed to citizenship status.
Justice Black dissented advancing that federal courts should be able to
exercise jurisdiction to hear habeas petition whenever any United States
official illegally imprisons any person in any land subject to U.S.
Government. 103
With respect to cases challenging detention of detainees, in
Korumatsu v. United States,10 4 American citizens of Japanese descent
were detained for violating laws that required them to remain in certain
areas of the United States. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction
under the grounds that the order was properly issued pursuant to
congressional and presidential authority to act in the wake of World War
II to protect national security. Likewise, in Hirabayashi v. United
States,10 5 the Court also upheld the order issued by the President that
created curfew restrictions against Japanese-Americans.
The very conscientious dissent in Korematsu1 6 is worth com-
menting upon. Justice Murphy made explicit his concern on the Court's
deference to the Executive branch. He suggested that, instead of the
Court's deference to the military, the judicial review would have to
entertain a balancing test on whether the deprivation of rights to the
individuals was so reasonably related to a public danger that was as
immediate, imminent, and impending as to not allow proper constitu-
tional procedures to obviate the danger.10 7 When the principles of Justice
Murphy's dissent are applied to the conditions of detainees' detention,
major issues may arise. Just as the individual's of Japanese ancestry
during the World War II, the Uighurs were detained in Guantanamo on
103 Id. at 798.
104 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
105 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
106 "This exclusion of 'all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-
alien,' from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence
of martial law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over 'the very
brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism." See
Korematsu, supra note 104, at 233 34. (J. Murphy, dissenting); see also Ex
Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 308 (1944) (J. Murphy, concurring) (agreeing that the
detention in Relocation Centers of persons of Japanese ancestry regardless of
loyalty is not only unauthorized by Congress or the Executive but is another
example of the unconstitutional resort to racism inherent in the entire evacuation
program).
107 Korematsu, supra note 104, at 234.
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the basis of their ancestry in that, for some, being in Afghanistan was
synonymous with being considered a member of Al-Qaeda.
For that matter, it is important to point out another remarkable
dissent by Justice Murphy. In re Yamashita0 8 contains one of the few
well-reasoned opinions ever made by a Justice in times when the
President cries for emergency. Once again, Justice Murphy dissented
with the ruling of an "emergency"-related case and cleverly claimed that
the detention of the Japanese General was purely influenced by discrimi-
natory actions. Justice Murphy also sought to warn the Court on the
danger stemming from its deference to presidential claims of power. ° 9
Justice Murphy's opinion seems to foreshadow that unchecked Govern-
ment power could result in a situation like the one we now have in
Guantanamo Bay. For example, to the extent the Uighurs were deter-
mined to have never been a threat to the U.S., it seems that they were
detained as an accident birth. They were just born Muslims and resided
in a place where terrorists were also operating. That they may have been
arrested and detained on the basis of their identity and on where they
were located, potentially creates questions of discrimination under our
Constitution. 1° That they would not have ever been able to challenge
that detention with a habeas appeal, however, clearly renders them
outside of constitutional protection. That issue will be the basis of the
discussion below.
10' In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
109 In re Yamashita, supra note 108, at 28 (J. Murphy, dissenting) ("The high
feelings of the moment doubtless will be satisfied. But in the sober afterglow
will come the realization of the boundless and dangerous implications of the
procedure sanctioned today. No one in a position of command in an army, from
sergeant to general, can escape those [sic] future Indeed, the fate of some future
President of the United States and his chiefs of staff and military advisers may
well have been sealed by this decision. But even more significant will be the
hatred and ill-will growing out of the application of this unprecedented proce-
dure. That has been the inevitable effect of every method of punishment disre-
garding the element of personal culpability. The effect in this instance, unfortu-
nately, will be magnified infinitely for here we are dealing with the rights of
man on an international level. To subject an enemy belligerent to an unfair trial,
to charge him with an unrecognized crime, or to vent on him our retributive
emotions only antagonizes the enemy nation and hinders the reconciliation
necessary to a peaceful world.")
110 See U.S. Const., XIV Amend. (proscribing discrimination on the basis of race
and national origin).
[v. 15
"WAR ON TERROR" SLIPPERY SLOPE POLICY
B. Judicial Rulings Post 9/11: The Potential Demise of
Marbury v. Madison.
"[I]t is the province of the judiciary to say what the
law is"''' I
Chief Justice Marshall, 1803
As the decision in Eisentrager indicates, the U.S. Supreme Court
explicitly distinguishes rights among U.S. citizens and alien detainees.
For this reason, this Article will analyze the various opinions related to
the detainees' based on their citizenship, since that status creates dif-
ferent legal implications. Many cases discussed in this section, Rasul, Al-
Odah, Qassim and Hamdam belong to the non-U.S. citizen category,
whereas Hamdi belongs to the U.S. citizen category. The underlying
implications revolve around the issue of whether drawing distinctions
among detainees premised on their status achieves any goals in preser-
ving national security in times of emergency or, rather, solely constitutes
an unwarranted denial of constitutional rights to the non-U.S. citizens.
These distinctions will be further analyzed in the three Subparts that
follow.
... In Madison, J. Marshall makes the historical critical ruling to empower the
federal courts with the ability to review actions of both the Executive and
Legislative branches. But that does not seem to strike the Court in times of
"emergency." These cases just serve was a "check" to reaffirm the notion of
how limited is the Judiciary power over the other branches. See, e.g., Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). So much so that the cases involving the
"War on Terror" are no different to those cases. The Supreme Court has stood
up for the proposition that it has very limited jurisdiction, if any, in cases
involving foreign relations, as Chief Justice Rehnquist once said that "certain
foreign relations must surely be controlled by political standards." See
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). But the question remains on how far
should the textual interpretation of the Constitution allow the other branches to
act without judicial oversight. The danger of confronting the inevitable refrains
the Judiciary of assessing the question of whether has the Executive abused of
its powers in the name of national security.
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1. Non-U.S. Citizens Category: Rasul 2 Al-Odah... Qassim11 4 and
Hamdan
11
Rasul and Al-Odah represented the first two cases arising out of the "War
on Terror" that the United States Supreme Court agreed to entertain.
However, they also represent, combined with the decision in Qassim, the
strength of the limitations the Judiciary imposes upon itself with regard
to contravening the acts of the Executive. In effect, these self-imposed
limitations expose the tension between the President's Article II powers
as Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Court's Article III powers to
interpret the law relating to issues arising of the alleged "War on Terror."
Upon consolidation of the cases Rasul and Al-Odah, the district court
dismissed them both for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that, because
the detainees were taken into custody in a territory outside the United
Sates, they were not entitled to the American courts. The court further
rationalized that the scope of the detainees' rights were for the military
and political branches to determine. 16 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's judgment.1 17 The sole question before the Supreme Court
in this case was whether foreign nationals in Guantanamo Bay may
invoke habeas corpus at all. After Eisentrager, either U.S. citizenship or
court jurisdiction (achieved through one's contact with the United States)
was necessary for this invocation, and, since these detainees were not
citizens, U.S. court jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay detainees was at
112 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
113 542 U.S. 933 (2004).
114 126 S. Ct. 1771 (U.S. 2006).
115 126 S. Ct 2749 (U.S. 2006).
116 One of the limitations imposed on the Judiciary lies on issues that are deemed
political in nature. In those cases, typically the Court faces questions of the
power struggle between the other branches whereupon it most likely refrains
from ruling on the grounds that they are "political questions." See Goldwater,
supra note 111.
117 Interestingly, the Court of Appeals did not give importance of the issue of
whether these detainees had cognizable constitutional rights of due process or to
the simple fact that United States had control and jurisdiction over the territory
by virtue of lease agreement, but went on reasoning that the plain language of
the lease provided that the United States recognizes the Republic of Cuba as an
independent sovereignty. In doing so, it either used this argument as shorthand
to its holding or simply failed to realize however, it was addressing the wrong
issue. Whatever the reason was, I leave it to the creative mind and common-
sense of thoughtful individuals.
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issue.'"8 According to the U.S. treaty with Cuba over Guantanamo Bay,
the U.S. had "complete jurisdiction" over the base, but Cuba has "ulti-
mate sovereignty." The Government relied on this particular language in
the treaty to argue that it implicitly meant U.S. courts had no jurisdiction
over those cases. In turn, the detainees countered that, regardless of what
the treaty language was, the U.S. had full legal control in the area and
should have jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The
case concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over the cases by
virtue of the fact that statutory habeas applied and, for the purposes of
this type of habeas, it mattered whether the U.S. was holding the person
as a prisoner. The location of the detention facility was deemed irrele-
vant. 119 Naturally, since the parties did not bring the issue of whether
there were constitutional rights violations, the Supreme Court was not
called upon to decide them. At that point, despite those detainees'
unknown fates, they had at least conquered the right to access the courts.
While the U.S. Government claims times of emergency call for
extreme measures, 20 the manner in which these cases have been adjudi-
cated serve as a portrait of an abusive exercise of power by the Execu-
tive, with little substantive response from the Judiciary branch.1 2 1 Legal
scholars have proposed many different paths which the courts could rely
upon to enable them to reach the merits of these cases without stepping
back and alleging procedural bars to review. 122 In other words, as the
118 Accord, Eisentrager, supra note 86.
119 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2007).
120 The Government advances that times of emergency overrides individual
rights.
121 Justice Stevens ruling in Rasul has been viewed as a superficial discussion of
territorial jurisdiction whereupon he makes no mention as to whether district
courts could be construed to have jurisdiction over the Secretary of Defense. In
concurring with the judgment, Justice Kennedy expressed his concerns as to the
creation of automatic statutory authority, stating he would rather hold that
federal courts would be permitted to have jurisdiction over Guantanamo
Detainees' cases if, he points out, the opinion had rather addressed the statutes
of Guantanamo and the indefinite detention of the detainees. See Rasul, supra
note 81.
122 See Barnes & Bowman, supra note 68, at 13 18. The Article contrasts the
opinions in Rasul and Al-Odah to the ruling in Eisentrager and lays out four
alternatives the Judiciary could have relied upon to take upon the merits of these
cases). The alternatives entail:
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concurring opinion in Rasul reinforces, the U.S. Supreme Court could
have taken another path and resolved the situation in Guantanamo years
ago, by deciding the case in terms of the expansiveness of constitutional
protections.
The implications of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rasul
can be recognized in cases later addressed in the D.C. District. For
example, Qassim v. Bush. In that case, two Uighurs detainees-who
were discussed at the beginning of this Article-filed a writ of habeas
corpus to be released from U.S. custody. The writ was filed in response
to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) determination that
neither of them was an enemy-combatant. The Government moved for a
stay of proceedings. Due to the Government's excessive secrecy, Qassim
and AI-Hakim's counsel was completely ignorant of the CSRT's
decision on their status which took place three months before the filing
of the writ. In the heat of several motions exchanged by both parties,
evidence indicated that the Government sought to hide the Uighurs'
status determination from their counsel.
On the one hand, the U.S. Government continuously advanced its
longstanding claim 123 that releasing these detainees would impair the
country's ability to conduct future foreign policy. On the other hand,
what could be characterized as a legitimate claim fails to provide a legal
basis to justify these detainees' prolonged detention. First, holding
individuals declared non-enemy combatants indefinitely does not seem to
provide the Government with any information on the "enemy." Second,
releasing non-enemy combatants would not defeat any of the country's
foreign policy. Rather, it would send a positive message to the
international community that this country conducts fair adjudicative
1) The Eisentrager Rule: the courts would have no judicial role in
reviewing the detention of aliens abroad;
2) De Facto sovereignty: the courts would be empowered to determine
their own jurisdiction by means of U.S. exercise of control over a
particular geographic area;
3) Statutory Jurisdiction: by means of legislative enactment;
4) Constitutional Jurisdiction: through the Due Process and Suspension
Clauses as judicial review mandates regardless of nationality or
location of the detention.
123 See, e.g., AJ-Joudi v. Bush, 2005 WL 774847 (D.D.C. 2005) and Al-Marri v.
Bush, 2005 WL 774843 (D.D.C. 2005). This has been the basic argument every
time the Government is faced with its nonsense arresting frenzy" after 9/11.
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proceedings and releases innocent detainees. In any event, the prosecu-
tors' conduct in this case is likely resultant from the U.S. Supreme
Court's failure to address the legality of these detentions in the initial
detention cases. Since the court did not address this issue, the Govern-
ment had no mandate to follow. In other words, there had been no
pronouncement setting forth court's legal standards for adjudicating the
detainees' cases. Hypothetically, the Court could have held that CSRT's
decisions on detainee's status had to be promptly communicated to the
detainee's counsel as part of the proceedings.
Had the Court in Rasul actively come forward in addressing the
legality of these detentions, or the rights that attach thereto, perhaps
innocent individuals would have been spared from the risk of unbounded
detention.124 With these judicial opinions' deficiencies in mind, the next
Subpart is denominated "Youngstown Revisited: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld"
for an important reason. As addressed in Part I of this Article, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Youngstown emphatically placed boundaries on the
Executive's ability to legislate. 125 This Article suggests that the Court's
attempt to revisit Youngstown's ruling is not achieved in the Court's
opinion in Hamdan explored below.
2. Youngstown Revisited. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Salim Ahmed Hamdan was a citizen of Yemen and a driver formerly
employed to work on an agricultural project that Osama bin Laden
created to gain the popular support of the people of Afghanistan.
Hamdan was captured by bounty hunters during the invasion of Afghani-
stan and purchased by the United States, then sent to Guantanamo. In
July 2004, he was charged with conspiracy to commit terrorism. 126 The
Bush administration then made arrangements to try him before a military
commission authorized under Military Commission Order No. 1 of
March 21, 2002.127 Hamdan filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
arguing that the military commission convened to try him was illegal and
lacked the protections required under the Geneva Conventions and
124 Judge Robertson's tone demonstrates indignation towards the U.S. Govern-
ment's conduct towards these innocent detainees. In any event, he remained
with his hands tight due to U.S. Supreme Court inability to set forth guidelines
to the lower courts.
125 See supra note 25.
126 See http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040714hcc.pdf.
127 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (establishing
Military Commissions guidelines for the prosecution of detainee).
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United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. Following the Supreme
Court ruling on another case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Hamdan was granted a
review before the CSRT, which determined that he was eligible for
detention by the United States as an enemy-combatant.
28
The D.C. District ruled in Hamdan's favor holding military
commissions could not be held unless it was first shown that Hamdan
was a prisoner of war. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. District
reversed. 29 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court con-
sidered whether the United States Congress may pass legislation preven-
ting the Supreme Court from hearing the case of an accused combatant
before his military commission takes place, whether the special military
commissions that had been set up violated the UCMJ and whether courts
can enforce the articles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
In addressing each issue in order, Justice Stevens denied the U.S.
Government's motion to dismiss the case. The Court reasoned that,
because Congress did not include language in the DTA that might have
precluded Supreme Court jurisdiction, the Government's argument was
unpersuasive. The Government's jurisdiction-stripping argument was
raised in Schlesinger v. Councilman, 30 and similarly rejected by the
Court. Councilman applied to a member of the U.S. military who was
being tried before a military "court-martial." In contrast, Hamdan is not a
member of the U.S. military, and would be tried before a "military
commission," not a court-martial. To the court, the more persuasive
precedent was Exparte Quirin,131 in which the court recognized its duty
to enforce relevant Constitutional protections by convening a special
term and expediting review of a trial by military commission. Since the
12' Hamdan, supra note 8, at 2749.
129 Id. The panel primarily held that military commissions are legitimate forums
to try enemy combatants because they have been approved by Congress.; the
Geneva Convention is a treaty between nations and as such it does not confer
individual rights and remedies; even if the Geneva Convention could be
enforced in U.S. courts, it would not be of assistance to Hamdan at the time
because, for a conflict such as the war against al-Qaeda that is not between two
countries, it guarantees only a certain standard of judicial procedure a "compe-
tent tribunal" without speaking to the jurisdiction in which the prisoner must
be tried; lastly under the terms of the Geneva Convention, al Qaeda and its
members are not covered. The court further favored the idea of president's
unconditional authority to convene military commissions.
130 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
'31 Supra note 105.
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DTA did not bar the Court from considering the petition, it was unneces-
sary to decide whether laws unconditionally barring habeas corpus
petitions would unconstitutionally violate the Suspension Clause.
1 32
Justice Stevens next reached the substantive issues of the case.
The case explicitly did not decide whether the President possessed the
constitutional power to convene military commissions like the one
created to try Hamdan. Rather, it held that, even if he possessed such
power, those tribunals would either have to be sanctioned by the "laws of
war," as codified by Congress in Article 21 of the UCMJ, or authorized
by statute. As to the statutory authorization, there is nothing in the
AUMF "even hinting" at expanding the President's war powers beyond
those enumerated in Art. 21. Instead, the AUMF, the UCMJ, and the
DTA "at most acknowledge" the President's authority to convene
military commissions only where justified by the exigencies of war, but
still operating within the laws of war. 1
33
As to the laws of war, to the majority these necessarily include
the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions, each of which require more
protections than the military commission provides. For example, Art. 36
(b) of the UCMJ requires that rules applied in courts-martial and military
commissions be "uniform insofar as practicable. ' 34 Justice Stevens
found several substantial deviations, including: defendant's (and defen-
dant's attorney) potential deprivation of access to certain evidence; a
defendant's right to discuss such evidence with his attorney; the admissi-
bility of hearsay, unsworn live testimony, and statements obtained
through torture; as well as the court's inability to hear appeals. 135 The
Court concluded that such provisions were in violation of UCMJ.
The Court also found that the military commissions' proposed
procedures violated the applicable Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. The Court found that the D.C. Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that the Conventions did not apply because: (1) it erroneously
relied on Eisentrager, which does not legally control in Hamdan's case
because there was then no deviation between the procedures used in the
tribunal and those used in courts-martial; (2) It erroneously ruled that the
Geneva Conventions do not apply because Article 3 affords minimal
132 Supra note 119.
133 However, the Court has previously acknowledged that the AUMF vested the
power to detain in the President. See Hamdi discussed in Part III of this Article.
134 Supra note 119.
135 id.
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protection to combatants "in the territory of' a signatory; and (3) Those
minimal protections include being tried by a "regularly constituted
court," which the military commission is not. Because the military
commission does not meet the requirements of the UCMJ or of the
Geneva Conventions, it violates the laws of war and therefore cannot be
used to try Hamdan. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the military
commissions set up by the Bush Administration to adjudicate the
detainees in Guantanamo violated both the UCMJ and the fourth Geneva
Convention. 1
36
However, the Court left critical questions unanswered in
Hamdan. First and foremost, the Court clearly avoided addressing the
issue of Presidential constitutional power to convene military commis-
sions, leaving the door open to congressional action and potentially
expressing deference to the Executive. Second, the Court did not decide
whether Hamdan would be entitled to a hearing as prescribed by Article
5 of the Geneva Conventions to determine his status as opposed to the
CSRT. As a result, what could initially have marked the Court actively
stepping up to take on its role to "say what the law is," the ruling in
Hamdan did not have much impact and was quickly negated by the MCA
statute.
Had the Court more actively curtailed political branch activities
as it did in Youngstown 137 years ago, perhaps the MCA would not have
been enacted and Guantanamo would come to an end or, at least, would
not continue to be a land of indefinite detention as it stands now. Subpart
(c) below addresses the Court's ruling in the citizen's category to further
demonstrate the implications of its amorphous rulings and arbitrary
distinctions amongst the detainees.
3. U.S. Citizen's Category: Hamdi13
In light of the decisions addressing non-U.S. citizens' claims, it is worth
considering the U.S. Supreme Court holdings in cases that involved U.S.
Citizens detained in Guantanamo. First, as a U.S. citizen, even as an
enemy-combatant, a detainee in this category has the right to file a writ
of habeas corpus in federal courts. Second, per the executive order that
established the camps at Guantanamo Bay, they can be transferred to and
tried at U.S. soil. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court reversed a
136 See Hamdan, supra note 115.
137 Supra note 25.
138 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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lower court dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus. The Court
recognized the U.S. Government had the power to detain unlawful
combatants, but held that U.S. citizen detainees must be entitled to
challenge their detention before an impartial judge. The court further
suggested that "some" due process has to be offer in the review process
of enemy combatants and rejected the Government's claim that those
issues were not within the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, it was
clear that the power of the President is not the same when it comes to
U.S. citizens' detention. In Hamdi, Justice O'Connor was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy in holding
that Hamdi was entitled to due process giving him meaningful
opportunity to challenge his enemy-combatant status and his detention.
39
Strikingly, Justice Scalia went even further to limit the power of the
Executive branch to detain. He laid down the two single options the
Executive could use to detain Hamdi. First, Congress would be required
to suspend the right to habeas corpus-power limited to cases of
invasion and rebellion. Neither these cases apply in Hamdi's case.
Second, Hamdi must be tried under normal criminal law. 140 Given the
differential access to courts and process, turning on whether or not an
individual is an U.S. citizen, the question is whether this disparate treat-
ment makes sense at all. Arguably, irrespective of any racial, ethnicity or
citizenship distinction, the detainees are being held under the same
139 "[Hamdi] unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in connection
with the proceedings on remand." Supra note 138, at 539.
140 Justice Scalia stated in part:
Where the Executive has not pursued the usual course of charge,
committal, and conviction, it has historically secured the Legisla-
ture's explicit approval of a suspension... Our Federal Constitution
contains a provision explicitly permitting suspension, but limiting
the situations in which it may be invoked: "The privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." Art. 1, §9,
cl. 2. Although this provision does not state that suspension must be
effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so under-
stood, consistent with English practice and the Clause's placement
in Article I.... The Suspension Clause was by design a safety valve,
the Constitution's only "express provision for exercise of extra-
ordinary authority because of a crisis," Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952).
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predicated assumption: they might be enemy combatants. To the extent
they present the same threats to the nation, stripping alien detainees of
the same rights granted to American citizens seems to be rationalized
under unpersuasive policy grounds. With that in mind, it is useful to
briefly discuss the meaning of the term "enemy-combatant" the para-
graphs that follows.
"Enemy-combatants" are defined as those who, in times of war,
engage in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,
including any person who had committed a belligerent act or had directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.14  The detainees in
Guantanamo would not, theoretically, be entitled to American civilian
courts, but only to the military tribunals. The impact of such distinction
is that military courts have a different body of rules set forth to deal with
the so-called "enemy."
In light of the above U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the panoply
of controversies that can arise from the distinction on the basis of
citizenship status lead to the issue of how different of a threat can an U.S.
citizen unlawful enemy-combatant be from a non-U.S. citizen? 4 2 The
difference in treatment of the detainees set forth in Hamdan and Hamdi
potentially deteriorates any incentives for the Government to institute
principles of equality in prescribing rights to the detainees . 143 In any
event, if any commonality can be found between U.S. citizens and non-
citizens cases, it is reflected in the Court's consistent avoidance of
141 U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. v. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp.
2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).
142 See Barnes & Bowman, supra note 68, at 34 35. The Article presents two
normative categories: "them" and "us" with respect to the War on Terror:
[W]here racialized suspects are clearly not a part of "us. Societal
attitudes such as these serve as silent support Government's policies,
which disproportionally impact a social marginalized group. This
combination of harmful legal impact and social ostracism also
undermines the credibility of the Government's actions, by discoura-
ging the likelihood that "we" might undertake the role as a mecha-
nism to ensure the fairness for "them."... [i]f Government regula-
tions disproportionally and severely infringe upon the rights of a
small group of individuals, whose interests are deemed neither akin
to, nor worth of protecting the majority, can this minority group be
treated fairly?
143 Supra note 61, at 35.
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addressing the question of President's power to convene military
commissions. This leaves the door open to bad law, to wit, the MCA.'44
After having provided the consequences of this expansive executive
power, the next Part will focus on the attempt to provide solutions to the
detainees' unbounded detention as well as address the impact of current
U.S. policies in the international community.
IV. ATTEMPTS TO "Fix" UNBOUNDED DETENTION
Ideally, principles of equality should apply to detainees. Irrespective of
their status, race, religion, or the like, they should be entitled to a robust
and fair adjudicative process for being "accused" of having potentially
committed the same crime against the same sovereignty as the U.S.
citizen detainees. In constructing this ideal "world" with an eye toward
avoiding a flood of federal habeas petitions by these individuals, it could
be possible to provide for an alternate form of legal review. By
establishing a doctrinal approach that allows for rational basis review in
exchange for jurisdiction, non-U.S. citizens would at least be able to
bring the claim before the courts and enable the courts to ensure
principles of separations of powers and due process are minimally
observed. While it may be plausible that aliens are not entitled to the full
panoply of constitutional guarantees under the Constitution, some basic
rights should be part of the package in lieu of the U.S. Government's
complete control over their freedom.
For example, one option would be to extend the types of due
process rights discussed in Hamdi to the whole group of detainees as part
of their adjudicative process. This model would entail an "adjusted due
process" to the effect that it be similar to those rights afforded to U.S.
citizens detained. By reducing the gap between domestic law and
international law of armed conflict, this approach would be particularly
narrow and solely apply to the detainees in times of war. This model
would enable detainees to have access to evidence intended to be used
against them, claim rights against self-incrimination, and have evidence
obtained by means of coercion stricken from the record. Not in the
ambiguous sense provided under the MCA, but in the real sense by
means of explicit language.
The Government's counterargument to allowing any due process
rights to alien detainees underlies the notion that it would be deprived of
144 See Amnesty's Article, supra note 72.
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critical enemy information. However, since the detainees are mostly held
incommunicado, this argument seems unpersuasive. It is of little surprise
that many scholars, after long years of studies of constitutional law and
criminal procedure, strongly censure how the Executive and the Judiciary
have dealt with these detentions. The Supreme Court seems to struggle
with the potential desire to do justice and to simply give deference to the
current political branches undertakings under the notion that federal
courts should refrain from adjudicating matters considered to involve
"political questions."'145 As this Article has previously indicated, foreign
relations might be envisioned as a matter fitting within the political
question doctrine. However, where the fundamental rights of individuals
are in question, an exception to the political question doctrine should be
made. While both alternatives might be highly speculative, this will not
change how poorly reasoned the rulings of these cases have been.
Take for instance the treatment of the Reasonableness Clause
146
of the Fourth Amendment as an example. This clause provides for the
protection of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. In
145There have been circumstances in which the Court has rejected jurisdiction
over cases that it deemed beyond its expertise. The Court ultimately enunciated
a three-part test to determine whether it should review a case. The inquiry
entailed: (1) whether there was constitutional textual commitment to coordinated
branches of Government; (2) whether the question is beyond judicial expertise;
and (3) whether prudential considerations counsel against judicial review. See
Powell v. McCormick. More specifically, in the area of foreign relations, see
Goldwater v. Carter, supra note 96 at (reasoning whether a President can res-
cind a treaty with another nation lacks textual commitment from the Consti-
tution, it is beyond the judicial expertise and prudential considerations prevent
the court from getting involved in foreign relations). While practical considera-
tions should make limitations on the judicial review advisable in certain cases,
the problematic notion that the Court sets a permanent disability with respect to
the issues it deems to be a political question should call for caution. In other
words, limits on claims' justiciability under the rationale of political question
should be sparingly used.
146 U.S. Const., Amend. IX (providing for the protection of "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and parti-
cularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.")
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that sense, the Fourth Amendment is a restraint on Executive power. 141
While the Executive claims the constitutional shield does not protect
alien detainees on the basis that they are not Americans on top of being
"enemy-combatants," nothing in the Amendment creates this distinction.
Furthermore, it would certainly serve the interest of equality and fairness
to replicate the Fourth Amendment principles to adequately adjudicate
how these men captured and detained. Nevertheless, a great number of
innocent individuals were arrested as Al-Qaeda members. Does this
reflect the reasonableness the Framers were expecting to promote? If
they were on U.S. soil or were citizens would we think so? Is there
anything in the Constitution that allows the Executive to detain aliens
abroad without any evidence against them in such an arbitrary manner? It
would obviously take some creativity in interpreting sections of the
Constitution to give positive answers to at least some of these questions.
Given, however, the current state of affairs in this country, this situation
might be required. Perhaps, as Joan Hartman has noticed, there is a
"widespread perception that suspension of human rights is practically
inevitable during periods of acute crisis." 148 However, such presumption
of fundamental rights derogation, oftentimes, tends to go beyond the
necessary, typically resulting in normalcy rather than exigency. 149 This
notion of normalcy may be reinforced by consequences which led to the
detainees' indefinite detention. Moreover, the duality between exigency
and obligation to abide by international norms is further endangered by
instituted principles of balance. On the scale, the balance seems almost
inevitably to tilt more to one side than to the other depending on how
much power each side holds. 150
141 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (J. Stevens, dissenting).
148 Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emer-
gencies, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 11(1981).
149 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 18, at 1073 (noticing the dialectic of normalcy-
rule, emergency-exception and their inherent conflating tendency in terms of
emergency where oftentimes they seem to occupy alternate, mutually exclusive
time frames when they actually blend in time, space and U.S. relations with the
world).
150 But abuse of power can expose the nation to serious future harm. As U.S.
President Harry Truman explained at the conference that founded the United
Nations: "[w]e all have recognized no matter how great our strength the we
must deny ourselves the licence to do always as we please."
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Another potential solution is to provide for an "immigration" fix
to the problems of these detainees. The Uighurs case fits within this
category. Now that most of Uighurs detainees were deemed to have
never been a threat to U.S. and are slated for release, China vehemently
claims some sort of "ownership" over them. Nevertheless, profound
concerns of retaliation 5 1 by Chinese authorities preclude U.S. authorities
from allowing sending them back to China.
In adopting the immigration fix approach, the U.S. Government
could consider using the immigration laws that have been applied to
individuals in similar situations, i.e., illegal aliens that are kept in cus-
tody pursuant to federal immigration regulations that provide for asylum
withholding removal 152 created in lieu of the Convention Against Torture
(CAT).153 In that case, these Uighurs would be detained in Guatanamo
until they could find asylum in another country.154 As to how the
"immigration" fix affected the Uighurs turned on the offer of asylum by
Albania. Under the "better-than-nothing" approach, they are at least out
of Guantanamo.
151 Chinese Foreign Affair spokesman, Liu Jianchao, has recently told the press
that China's authorities are not going to engage in the abuse of human rights as
soon as one mentions criminal suspects. He further said that "abusing criminal
suspects is not Government policy," asserting its illegality. However, the major-
ity of press present at this conference has claimed that Chinese authorities have
been hiding its unacceptable behavior against the Uighurs under the disguise of
the war on terror and the military support of the U.S. and obtaining their
Security Council acquiescence to such conduct. See http://www.running-dog.co.
uk/newsasp?newsitem-0032.
152 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2005).
153 The U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (CAT). See generally
Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.REv. 275, 275-96 (1994).
154 This would not be first case dealing with these types of regulations. For
illustrative cases on how the courts have dealt with the matter, see, e.g., Zewdie
v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 804 (2004) and Yi-Tu Lian v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 457
(2004) (establishing that the test to trigger the code under the Convention
Against Torture is whether the individual is likely to be tortured if sent back to
the country of removal, a more probably than not inquiry).
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Lastly, there are some other creative propositions. For example,
legal scholars have suggested a "monetary" fix to wrongfully detained
individuals. Basically, the monetary fix advances the notion that impos-
ing monetary sanctions upon the Government would operate as a
deterrent against future abuse of Executive power. In other words, a
money sanction would provide for a mechanism of "preventive deten-
tion." While comprising a valid brainstorming in the quest for a solution
to the unbounded detentions, this creative solution rests on the assump-
tion that money will also restore the dignity and freedom to these
individuals. 155
As these examples reveal, many propositions have been advanced
to provide for a solution to these detainees with no particular success.
Meanwhile, human rights advocates have their eyes centered on our
nation. The Human Rights Watch has recently expressed its concerns
with respect to the MCA. It advanced that the military commissions "fall
far short of international due process standards."' 56 It has been articulated
that U.S. "artificial" derogation from the Geneva Conventions by virtue
155 Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1062
66 (2004).
156 The military commissions fall far short of international due process stan-
dards. They:
* Deprive defendants of independent judicial oversight by a civilian
court.
* Restrict the defendant's right to choose his lawyer.
* Deprive defense counsel of the means to prepare an effective defense.
* Improperly subject criminal suspects to military justice.
* Prosecute prisoners-of-war in a manner that violates the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
* Place review of important interlocutory questions with the charging
authority.
* Fail to guarantee that evidence obtained via torture or ill-treatment shall
not be used.
* Allow wide latitude to close proceedings and impose a "gag order" on
defense counsel.
* Deprive military defense counsel of normal protections afforded mili-
tary lawyers from improper "command influence."
* Provide lower due process standards for non-citizens than for U.S.
citizens.
See generally Jennifer Daskal, How to Close Guantanamo, 24 WORD POLICY
JOURNAL 29 37 (Fall 2007).
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of the MCA leaves open the door for other States to "opt-out" as well. In
other words, any step back from the Geneva Conventions could also
provoke mistreatment of captured U.S. military personnel. In addition,
scholars of international jurisprudence claim there have been over 50
years since Geneva was entered into force and it has been applied in
every conflict. 157 However, U.S. current policies undercut the over-
arching principles under international law to strive for uniform human
rights policies around the World. In the current state of affairs, the
Executive branch becomes three branches in one: legislator, executive
enforcer, and judge of its own actions. The lack of independent judicial
oversight deprives detainees from the opportunity of impartial judicial
review of verdicts, regardless of their arbitrariness or lack of legal
soundness.
In response to the consequences of this expansive executive
power, the U.N. Human Rights Committee stated that the use of military
courts could present serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial,
independent administration of justice is concerned. As detainees have
increasingly been deemed non-enemy-combatants, it is possible to assess
how the Executive, now Congressional actions, captures civilians who
had no connection to the armed conflict. In other words, as a conse-
quence of the disparate overreaching power of the political branches and
a rather weakened Judiciary, the U.S. is substantially regarded by the
international community with complete disapproval.
Thus, the impact of U.S. current polities in the International
Community is, at the very least, alarming. If entitling the detainees to a
unified due process approach seems unrealistic, at minimum, they should
be treated in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva
Conventions. Relevant provisions in the Third Convention provide that
detainees are entitled to a presumption of protection thereunder, "until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal."
The detainees must first be designated as civilians, combatant, or
criminals rather than lumped into a single composite group of unlawful
combatants by presidential fiat. Moreover, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights mandates that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention and those deprived of liberty shall be entitled
157 See generally United Nations Treaty Collections at http://untreaty.un.
org/English/treaty.asp.
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to take proceedings before a court."'5 8 The meaning of "court" within the
Covenant was aimed at civilian courts, not military, in the sense that the
preoccupation was to provide them with a fair adjudication with respect
to the detainees' status. Yet, the U.S. Government chose to ignore the
requirements under international law despite apparently false claims that
it would be followed.15 9 Instead, as previously discussed in Part ii of this
Article, Congress made sure that international law does not provide a
substantive basis of relief for these detainees' claims by virtue of the
MCA.
The vast cultural, economic and political differences among
signatory States were deemed as plausible justification for permitting
reservations treaties. By this mechanism, the States are provided the
opportunity to somewhat "tailor" multilateral treaties to their realities. It
is evident that the U.S. Government has granted itself the right not to be
entirely bound by international law. How wise the use of this mechanism
was undertaken by U.S. may be reflected by the current the impact of
U.S. policies toward international law mandates. As the detainees'
situation develops, however, the U.S. image within the international
community is in serious jeopardy. As a result a widespread criticism of
the U.S. policies generated an atmosphere of wariness of U.S's ability
and willingness to preserve individuals' fundamental rights at any time a
situation is categorized as "emergency."
158 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-ICCPR. While U.S. is
a signatory State, it has exercised the right of making reservations to the rights
provided under the Covenant. For example, by virtue of "U.S. Reservations,
Declarations, and Understandings to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S.4783 84 (April 2, 1992), Senate opts out of
Article 7 of the Covenant by binding the meaning of "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment" to conform to those under the Fifth, Eighth,
and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of United States. The practi-
cal effect of this reservation is to release U.S. Government from any liability
that may arise outside of the meaning of the U.S. Constitution with respect to the
humane treatment of the detainees.
159 Regardless of the Government's promise to treat the Guantanamo detainees
accordingly, President Bush has determined that the terms of their detention are
not governed by Geneva Convention because of their status of "unlawful
combatants." See White House Press Release at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/02/20020207. Fortunately, U.S. courts' decisions have indi-
cated that the President is not accurate in his determination. E.g., Padilla v.
Bush, 2002 WL 31718308 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2002).
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V. CONCLUSION
All the problems outlined in this Article can be corrected. It would not
take more than going back to the Constitution and reconstituting the
Framers' intent in promoting the leadership of the country as an integral
body composed by the three branches of Government. The U.S.
Government should ensure that the wide gap between domestic law and
the law of armed conflict is minimized by allowing those tried before
military commissions to receive trials up to the level of American justice.
If no action is taken, the American justice once internationally admired
will give space to a stain in the American history. Congress should be
more active in undertaking its role of making the law rather than merely
voting on proposals based on their political agenda or the Executive's
wishes. The Judiciary should step up and actively "say what the law is"
rather than handing down amorphous rulings stigmatizing detainees on
the basis of their citizenship status. Under basic constitutional principles,
doing justice means equal protections of the laws. Using the claim of
times of emergency to justify abusive treatment does not foster a
democratic society. If the military is not able to advance legal grounds to
hold these detainees, they should be released. The Judiciary should be
eager to have a case challenging the MCA sooner rather than later and
take the opportunity to lay down a clearly ruling on how these detainees
should be accorded equal safeguards regardless of their race, national
origin, or status. In other words, the Judiciary should take back what
Congress has taken away, through implementing major modifications to
the Executive's ill-conceived policies regarding commissions. In terms
of meaningful separation of powers mandates, what the Constitution has
given, Congress cannot take away.
The U.S. Government should also step back and develop a
positive dialogue with thei international community by allowing them to
voice their concerns and make them participants in the detention policies
and mechanisms for adjudication. Rather than relying on its reservations
with respect to international norms, U.S. should take the historical step to
improve traditional laws of armed conflict and create a more coherent
and fair adjudicative model. For example, as this Article proposed, a
remodeled international due process model could be instituted. This
Article concludes that, in the current state of affairs, the overbroad and
abusive scope and nature of the U.S. foreign policies fall short in
achieving these ideals.
[v. 15
